I. INTRODUCTION
We live in an age marked by natural disasters, pandemics, and terrorism. Individually and in combination, these destructive forces provoke sociopolitical and economic havoc across the country. Pennsylvanians are intimately familiar with the devastating effects of flooding, severe tornadoes, and crippling snowstorms. Moreover, the very landscape of Pennsylvania bears the scars of the wreckage of a failed terrorist airplane hijacking. Such disasters, be they attributable to nature or humankind, present unique challenges to state and local governments. During such crisis, officials-from small-town mayors to the Governor-are called upon to make critical, timesensitive decisions. Some of these decisions will be wise and prove effective, while others may not. Against this backdrop of seemingly impending crisis, it is critical that the legal powers of elected officials be clearly understood before they are needed.
This article explores one such disaster-related legal issue by answering the question: When the Governor of Pennsylvania declares a state of emergency, what are his emergency management powers, and what is the breadth of the scope of these powers? Answering this question requires an understanding of state governors' powers in general, which is presented in J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 152
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It is noteworthy that the Constitution does not expressly authorize the issuance of executive orders and proclamations. 14 The Governor of Pennsylvania assumes his emergency management powers under specific provisions of the Emergency Management Services Code ("the Code"). 15 One of the stated purposes for the Code is to "[c]larify and strengthen the role[] of the Governor . . . in prevention of, preparation for, response to and recovery from disasters." 16 Furthermore, the Code announces that it does not intend to " [l] imit, modify or abridge the authority of the Governor to proclaim martial law or exercise any other powers vested in him under the Constitution, statutes or common law of this Commonwealth." 17 Section 7301, entitled "General authority of Governor," addresses emergency declarations and the Governor's emergency management powers. 18 The Governor is designated as the State's foremost first responder and is thus "responsible for meeting the dangers to this Commonwealth and people presented by disasters." 19 The Governor is empowered to "issue . . . executive orders [and] at § 7301(c). The order or proclamation must be "disseminated promptly by means calculated to bring its contents to the attention of the general public," and a copy must be filed with the Pennsylvania Emergency Management J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 153
Emergency Management "disaster emergency," when a "disaster has occurred or . . . the occurrence or the threat of a disaster is imminent." 21 Absent the Governor's renewal, the declaration of a disaster emergency automatically terminates after 90 days. Alternatively, the General Assembly may terminate a state of emergency at any time.
22
Subsection (f) of 7301 specifically enumerates the emergency management powers conferred upon the Governor by the Code. The Governor may:
(1) Suspend the provisions of any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of Commonwealth business, or the orders, rules or regulations of any Commonwealth agency, if strict compliance with the provisions of any statute, order, rule or regulation would in any way prevent, hinder or delay necessary action in coping with the emergency.
(2) Utilize all available resources of the Commonwealth Government and each political subdivision of this Commonwealth as reasonably necessary to cope with the disaster emergency. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 154
Spring 2012 (4) Subject to any applicable requirements for compensation under section 7313(10) (relating to powers and duties), commandeer or utilize any private, public or quasi-public property if necessary to cope with the disaster emergency.
(5) Direct and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or threatened area within this Commonwealth if this action is necessary for the preservation of life or other disaster mitigation, response or recovery.
(6) Prescribe routes, modes of transportation and destinations in connection with evacuation.
(7) Control ingress and egress to and from a disaster area, the movement of persons within the area and the occupancy of premises therein.
(8) Suspend or limit the sale, dispensing or transportation of alcoholic beverages, firearms, explosives and combustibles. 23 Subsequent sections of the Code grant the Governor the following additional authority: "to enter into purchase, lease or other arrangements with any Federal agency for temporary housing units" and "[to] assist any political subdivision of this Commonwealth . . . to acquire sites necessary for such temporary housing . . . by advancing or lending funds" appropriated for any purpose by the General Assembly or to "pass through" funds furnished by "any agency, public or private"; 24 "to clear or remove from publicly or J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 155
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25 "to apply to the Federal Government, on behalf of [a] political subdivision, for a loan and to receive and disburse the proceeds of any approved loan to any applicant political subdivision;
26 to accept and disburse Federal dollars "to meet disaster-related necessary expenses or serious needs of individuals or families."
27 Finally, the Code establishes the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) to oversee and implement a statewide civil defense and disaster relief program. 28 The Governor heads the Agency's Council and has the power to appoint the Agency's Director as well as various representatives to serve as nonvoting members of the Council.
29

IV. BREADTH OF THE PENNSYLVANIA GOVERNOR'S EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT POWERS
The plain language of the Code evinces the expansive scope of the Governor's emergency management powers. A manifest legislative purpose behind the Code is to "strengthen the role[] of the Governor . . . in prevention of, preparation for, response to and recovery from disasters."
30 Thus, the Code aims to delineate and bolster the Governor's powers vis-à-vis the entire arc of emergency management, from prevention efforts to mitigation and recovery measures. In a section entitled "Limitations," the General Assembly emphasized that the Code in no way circumscribes the usual powers vested in 25 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 156 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 157 42 Id. 43 
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J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 158 direction when needed to local efforts before, during and after" disaster emergencies; and, renew the state's responsibility for requesting and procuring "federal resources to deal with emergencies." 44 As in the Senate, no member of the House rose to register a complaint with respect to the expansive powers bestowed upon the Governor.
As the Bill proceeded through Committee, it was subject to multiple considerations in both the House and Senate, and amendments were proposed and approved. However, through seven versions-Printer's Numbers: 1306 (original), 1434, 1559, 1616, 1642, 2107, and 2213 (final)-the only significant change to Section 7301 came early in the process. Subsection (c) of 7301 was altered to extend the duration of the period of the Governor's declared disaster emergency from 30 days to 90 days. 45 This is significant insofar as a shorter period is perceived by the National Governors Association (NGA) to constitute a "limitation[] on emergency powers." 46 The NGA notes that ten states require that emergency declarations expire in less than 30 days, 16 states do not permit emergency declarations to exceed 30 days, and just 5 states allow emergency declarations to last 60 days or more.
47
Pennsylvania's Governor has the authority to declare one of the longest states of emergency of any governor in the United States.
Ultimately, and without a single challenge to the contemplated powers granted to the Governor, the House 48 and Senate 49 both unanimously approved the Bill. Then-Governor Milton Shapp signed the Bill into law on 44 
Id.
45 See S. 1104, 161st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1978). 46 NGA, GOVERNOR'S GUIDE, supra note 5. 47 Id. at 15. 48 H. JOURNAL, 162nd Gen. Assemb., vol. 5, at 3662-63 (Pa. Nov. 14, 1978) (the vote was 190-0).
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November 26, 1978. 50 The Code has been amended on numerous occasions since its enactment. Notably, however, Section 7301 was amended just once in July 1988. The amendment in question pertained to Subsection (f)(4) of 7301 and clarified-as well as arguably expanded-the Governor's commandeering power. The Subsection's language granting the Governor authority to commandeer or utilize any private property, if necessary, to cope with [a] disaster emergency was amended to grant the Governor authority to "commandeer or utilize any private, public or quasi-public property . J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 160
Spring 2012 from arbitrary government action," 54 it is important to understand not only the conceded breadth of a governor's powers, but also the existence and function of checks on those powers. This Part will explore four limiting factors as they relate to the emergency management powers of the Governor of Pennsylvania: (A) qualified suspension of laws, (B) separation of powers, (C) judicial review, and (D) the scope of an emergency. 56 In fact, a search of the entire Pennsylvania statutes yields only nine other references to "regulatory statute." Again, the term is not defined in connection with any of these references. One statutory section, establishing Commonwealth Court jurisdiction over "regulatory criminal cases," will receive further treatment herein. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 762 (2011). J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 162
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Spring 2012 It can be inferred from this language that regulatory statutes are statutes that are primarily, if not exclusively, administered by Commonwealth agencies. Does it follow that these regulatory statutes comprise a unique or narrower class of statutes, traditionally the province of Commonwealth agencies? Furthermore, can the term "Commonwealth agencies" be read to mean "administrative agencies" in the traditional sense, 62 such that the Governor truly is constrained to suspending certain regulatory statutes as administered by certain administrative agencies? Not necessarily.
Commonwealth agencies, within the meaning of Section 762 of the Judicial Code, are those agencies subject to the Administrative Law and Procedure provisions of the Pennsylvania Statutes.
63 Section 501(a) of the pertinent Subchapter A states: "[t]his subchapter shall apply to all Commonwealth agencies."
64 Elsewhere in Title 2, the term "Commonwealth agencies" is defined to include "[a]ny executive agency or independent agency." 65 The term "executive agencies" is further defined to include "[t]he Governor and the departments, boards, commissions, authorities and other officers and agencies of the Commonwealth government," while the term "independent agencies" is further defined to include "[b]oards, commissions, authorities and other agencies and officers of the Commonwealth government [that] are not subject to the policy supervision and control of the Governor." 66 Id. An example of an independent commission would be the Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission. "The Commission is an independent governmental commission. The Commission is considered an independent agency and a 'Commonwealth Agency' for the purposes of Subchapter A of Chapter 5 of Title 2 (relating to practice and procedure of Commonwealth agencies)." Commonwealth v. CSX Transp., Inc., 639 A.2d 1213, 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (citations omitted).
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Emergency Management "Commonwealth agencies" is quite broad and encompasses considerably more than administrative agencies as traditionally understood. 67 Whatever varying conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the Governor is authorized to suspend provisions of a regulatory statute administered by a Commonwealth agency. Pennsylvania's Disease Prevention and Control Law 71 (DPCL) is a prime example of a regulatory statute administered by a Commonwealth agency. The final authority to implement and enforce provisions of the DPCL is vested in the State Department of Health. 72 The purpose of the DPCL is the prevention and control of communicable and non-communicable diseases. 73 As such, the law is indisputably a "result of the exercise of the state's police power to enact regulations to promote the public health . . . ." 74 These observations contribute to the conclusion that the Governor could almost certainly exercise his emergency management powers in suspending provisions of the DPCL. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 165
Emergency Management own boards of health or departments of health may enact ordinances or issue rules and regulations "relating to disease prevention and control." 76 Presumably, Subsection (f)(1) of 7301 empowers the Governor to suspend any-and-all such ordinances, rules, or regulations. This is not to suggest that the Governor could abjectly ignore procedural due process protections as they relate to the activities of quarantine or isolation. DPCL Sections 521.7 and 521.11(a.2) provide for a hearing by a court when individuals suspected of being ill with communicable diseases refuse to submit to "examination and diagnosis" and "treatment." Individuals who refuse to be examined may be "committed by the court to an institution . . . ."
77 Similarly, when individuals refuse treatment, "the court shall . . . order such person to be committed to an appropriate institution or hospital . . . ." 78 Consequently, there does not appear to be support for the Governor, even during a declared disaster emergency, to attempt to circumvent procedures engaging the courts in this active role. 1) . It is worth noting that in enacting the J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 166
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Finally, it is useful to look to other state's emergency management laws to compare the suspension powers granted to those states' governors with the suspension powers granted to Pennsylvania's Governor. This analysis reveals that the majority of governors are specifically authorized to suspend "regulatory statutes" or the "provisions of any regulatory statute." 80 Only seven states authorize their governors to suspend any statute or law whatsoever. 81 Finally, the remaining four states appear to constrain their Counterterrorism Act, the PA General Assembly adopted neither the "conditions and principles" nor the "least-restrictive-means" requirement of the MSEHPA. 80 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8571 (1990) (Noting that "[d]uring a state of war emergency or a state of emergency the Governor may suspend any regulatory statute, or statute prescribing the procedure for conduct of state business, or the orders, rules, or regulations of any state agency, including subdivision (d) of Section 1253 of the Unemployment Insurance Code, where the Governor determines and declares that strict compliance with any statute, order, rule, or regulation would in any way prevent, hinder, or delay the mitigation of the effects of the emergency."). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:724 (1993) (describing that "in addition to any other powers conferred upon the governor by law, he may . . . [s]uspend the provisions of any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of state business, or the orders, rules, or regulations of any state agency, if strict compliance with the provisions of any statute, order, rule, or regulation would in any way prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with the emergency."). See generally the similar laws of Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia similarly reference their governors' ability to suspend "regulatory statutes" during emergencies. 81 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 28-9(a) (1975) (which notes that "the governor is authorized and empowered to modify or suspend in whole or in part . . . any statute, regulation or requirement or part thereof whenever the Governor finds such statute, regulation or requirement, or part thereof, is in conflict with the efficient and expeditious execution of civil preparedness functions or the protection of the public health"); see also N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 29-a (1978) (which provides that "the governor may by executive order temporarily suspend specific provisions of any statute, local law, J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 167
Emergency Management governor's suspension powers. For example, while Michigan's governor may "[s]uspend a regulatory statute, order or rule," the state legislature was explicit that this power does not extend to "the suspension of criminal process and procedures."
82 Idaho, South Carolina, and South Dakota only permit their governors to suspend "the provisions of any regulation," "the provisions of existing regulations," and "any rules of any state agency," respectively. 83 In these states' emergency management laws, any reference to the suspension of statutes, regulatory or otherwise, is absent.
B. SEPARATION OF POWERS
The legal principles embodied in the doctrine of the separation of powers operate to fundamentally curb gubernatorial overreaching. "The separation of governmental powers into legislative, executive, and judicial is provided for in practically all the American state constitutions," and is designed to preclude one branch or actor representing that branch from interfering with or encroaching upon the basic powers of another branch or actor representing that branch. 84 In the context of the exercise of emergency management powers, it has been argued that state governors, embodying executive power, on occasion invade the spheres of the legislature or the courts. What is the scope of the Pennsylvania Governor's emergency management powers vis-à-vis the Pennsylvania General Assembly and the state's system of courts? ordinance, or orders, rules or regulations or parts thereof, of any agency during a state disaster emergency, if compliance with such provisions would prevent, hinder, or delay action necessary to cope with the disaster." Connecticut and New York are joined by Arizona, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, and Tennessee in granting apparently broad suspension powers to their governors. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w
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As discussed in the preceding section, the Governor is authorized to "[s]uspend the provisions of any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of Commonwealth business," if he deems it necessary to cope with an emergency. 85 Yet, the Governor's action in suspending the operation of laws enacted by the General Assembly constitutes something beyond the exercise of traditional executive powers. The Pennsylvania Constitution states: "No power of suspending laws shall be exercised unless by the Legislature or by its authority."
86 While it is true that such an action is countenanced by authorizing legislation, the exercise of such authority could be used to countermand, at least for a time, any number of laws adopted by the General Assembly. Hence, in exercising this particular emergency management power, the Governor can potentially intrude upon the legislative function.
Nevertheless, an unassailable tenet of the separation-of-powers doctrine is that the "Legislative branch of government creates laws," and that the Governor is bound to "execute the laws and not to create or interpret them." 87 Not only does the General Assembly create the laws, but it is also vested with the power to amend or repeal laws.
88 Accordingly, the General Assembly, should it see fit, could amend or repeal Subsection (f)(1) of 7301 and thereby "dial back" the Governor's ability to suspend laws during declared disaster emergencies. Moreover, Subsection (c) of 7301 limits the Governor's ability to declare and maintain a state of disaster emergency by granting the General Assembly the power to terminate a state of emergency at any time by concurrent resolution. 89 89 See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(c) (2011) (The NGA characterizes the ability of a legislature to intervene to terminate a declaration of a state of emergency as a "limitation on emergency powers," and notes that in at least J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 170
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THE PENNSYLVANIA COURTS
The Pennsylvania Constitution provides: "[t]he judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system consisting of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court, courts of common pleas, community courts, . . . [and] such other courts as may be provided by law and justices of the peace." 94 The judiciary is a coequal branch of the Commonwealth government. 95 While the General Assembly may create "additional courts or divisions of existing courts" and may abolish "any statutory court or division thereof," 96 the General Assembly may not exercise any power specifically entrusted to the judiciary. 
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Typically, actions invoking such review challenge the executive order on the grounds that the Governor issued it in the absence of either constitutional authority or a legislative mandate. 111 Accordingly, what is the proper standard and scope of judicial review for executive orders?
"An executive order issued by the Governor which serves to implement or supplement the Constitution or a statute has the force of law, and therefore may be characterized and treated as an administrative regulation, at least for purposes of judicial review." 112 A reviewing court will ordinarily afford considerable weight and deference to an administrative agency's promulgation of regulations pursuant to the statute it administers. "Our standard of review over regulations is very limited. We will not substitute our judgment for the agency's and will not strike down regulations unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown or the agency has exceeded its statutory powers." 113 If the Governor's executive order is analogous to an administrative regulation (for purposes of judicial review), it is reasonable to surmise that the review of such an order will be limited and highly deferential.
The sufficiency of the Pennsylvania Governor's executive order declaring a disaster emergency and the related exercise of his suspension powers were addressed by the Commonwealth Court in In re Farrow. 114 In that case, Petitioner Paula Brown challenged the Governor's extension of a statutorily mandated filing time for nomination petitions by his issuance of an Executive Branch of government; and (3) orders which serve to implement or supplement the constitution or statutes).
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115 Brown asserted that the Governor lacked the requisite authority because "there was no legitimate emergency" and the order itself "did not provide that a 'State of Emergency' was declared throughout the State of Pennsylvania."
116
The Governor filed a petition to intervene, which the court granted.
117
As justification for the extension of the filing deadline, the Governor cited Section 7301(f)(1) of the Emergency Management Services Code as authorizing the "suspen [sion] [of] the provisions of any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of Commonwealth business" during a state of emergency. 118 The court, while conceding that the Governor's executive order did not explicitly state that he was declaring a "State of Emergency," assumed a highly deferential posture and found that the order "did in fact [declare such an emergency] because it contained all the requirements to so declare a state of emergency." 119 The court was satisfied that the Governor had discerned that a disaster emergency existed and that, as a result of the emergency conditions, it was "necessary to extend the filing deadline for all nomination petitions by 24 hours in order to give all candidates a fair and reasonable opportunity to file their petitions."
120
Deferring to the Governor's legislatively authorized power to issue an executive order declaring a disaster emergency and to exercise his suspension 115 See id. at 33-34 (noting that Brown specifically objected to the nomination petition filed by James Farrow for the Office of State Representative of the 162nd District in the Democratic Primary to be held on April 4, 2000. Nomination petitions were required to be filed no later than 5:00 PM on January 25, 2000, pursuant to the Election Code, 25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2873; Farrow filed his nomination petition on January 26, 2000, beyond the original deadline but within the extension granted by the Governor). 116 Id. at 134. 117 Id. at 34 n.2. 118 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(f)(1) (2011). 119 In re Farrow, 754 A.2d at 35. 120 
Id.
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Emergency Management powers in extending the filing deadline, the court denied Brown's petition. 121 While the Commonwealth Court stopped short of outlining in concrete terms the parameters of its review, it acknowledged and fulfilled its duty to review the Governor's actions. 122 This case demonstrates that, when called up to do so, Pennsylvania courts will not abdicate their responsibility to review the actions of the Governor in connection with a disaster emergency and that review will likely be limited in scope and highly deferential.
D. SCOPE OF THE DISASTER
The Pennsylvania Code permits the Governor to declare a disaster emergency "upon finding that a disaster has occurred or that the occurrence or the threat of a disaster is imminent."
123 The Code defines "disaster" to include "[a] man-made disaster, natural disaster or war-caused disaster."
124 Of interest, the Code discusses and defines a "local emergency" as something separate and apart from other types of disaster emergencies. "Local emergency" is defined as follows:
The condition declared by the local governing body when in their judgment the threat or actual occurrence of a disaster is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant coordinated local government action to prevent or alleviate the damage, loss, hardship or suffering threatened or caused thereby. A local emergency arising wholly or substantially out of a 121 Id. at 36. 122 See id. at 35 (noting that the Pennsylvania Election Code is a clear example of a regulatory statute); see also Commonwealth v. Wadzinkski, 422 A.2d 124, 127 (Pa. 1980) (referring to the Election Code as a regulatory statute in an action challenging the constitutionality of a provision imposing criminal sanctions upon a candidate who publishes a political advertisement referring to an opponent without first complying with prescribed notice requirements). 
